Public trust key in Koh Kut challenge

Recently, the Paetongtarn Shinawatra government and her praetorian guards have been up in arms, defending their position on the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Thailand and Cambodia. She has said that the government will negotiate with Phnom Penh and will soon establish a joint technical committee to do just that.
At this juncture, whatever the future may hold, all her efforts will come to nothing as there is no public trust in the government’s endeavour. Without restoring public trust first, the Koh Kut affair could explode into a ball of fire that would barbecue all of the collaborators.
The MoU was first signed in 2001 under Ms Paetongtarn’s father, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. It outlines a framework for managing overlapping maritime areas in the Gulf of Thailand. However, the opposition Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) has recently raised concerns that the MoU could compromise Thailand’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over Koh Kut. Furthermore, it could also impact demarcation and resource-sharing. Oddly enough, when PPRP was in the government, it completely ignored this concern.
Throughout Thai-Cambodian history, territorial disputes have been a matter of life-or-death squabbles, in some cases leading to border skirmishes. The Phraviharn/Preah Vihear Temple affair should serve as a fresh reminder that the dispute between the two countries, which claimed ownership of the ancient Hindu temple complex near the border, could have led to extreme and unyielding measures in the fight. Today, the apparent cordial ties could be torn up when nationalism reigns, with one country accusing the other of violating sovereignty.
The fear stoked by the opposition party and far-right nationalist groups has already generated worry over the planned talks about the demarcation of overlapping maritime areas in the Gulf of Thailand. The issue, which has been on the table for over two decades, was pushed forward in Thaksin’s public speech in August. He said Thailand and Cambodia should wrap up their overlapping developing claims to extract oil and gas for mutual economic benefit. He concluded the energy resources would be useless otherwise.
With his enthusiasm on display a few days after his daughter, Ms Paetongtarn, was anointed prime minister, public anxiety shot up. Truth be told, Thai-Cambodian ties are balanced on a thin line, with history showing that small incidents could lead to further calamity. If Ms Paetongtarn has not gained the much-needed public trust, whether on her own credentials or through her father, the fear of losing sovereignty will continue. Worse still is the impact of the 30+ years of “buddy-buddy” relations between Thaksin and former Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen. What is more dangerous is Thaksin’s preponderance when one is least expecting it to break with convention.
To be fair, the excellent leadership rapport between Thaksin and Hun Sen could serve as a tool for both sides to be more flexible and accommodated in their negotiations on resource-sharing in ways that would not jeopardise the territorial integrity of both countries.
In 2009, Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as his personal adviser, angering the Abhisit government. This move was a clear sign of Phnom Penh’s dissatisfaction with Bangkok. In response, PM Abhisit Vejjajiva sought to annul the 2001 MoU on maritime boundaries, seeing Thaksin’s role as a conflict of interest. However, his government could not get House approval to complete the process.
The task then fell to the Yingluck Shinawatra government, but it also failed to act due to her removal in a 2014 coup led by Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha. As a result, the MoU remains unchanged. Thaksin later resigned as Hun Sen’s adviser, but the controversy still affects Thai-Cambodian relations.
As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has painstakingly explained, the 2001 MoU serves as a framework for future negotiations on maritime demarcation and economic benefits from energy resource development. The MoU stipulates that negotiations on these issues must be carried out simultaneously and cannot be separated.
The dispute over maritime boundaries goes back to the early 1970s. In 1972, Cambodia claimed a 200-nautical-mile continental shelf, prompting Thailand to make a similar claim in 1973. This resulted in an overlapping area of about 26,000 square kilometres in the Gulf of Thailand, which is believed to contain significant natural gas reserves estimated at 311 billion cubic metres.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand asserts full sovereignty over Koh Kut, citing a 1907 treaty between Siam and France that clearly states, “Koh Kut belongs to Thailand”. However, Cambodia has used a point on Koh Kut to define its maritime claims, leading to concerns in Thailand about potential territorial loss.
Ahead of the negotiation, the government needs to seriously address two important issues — public distrust and rising nationalist sentiment. Given the legacy of the Preah Vihear dispute, many Thais still view the Koh Kut situation through a historical lens. Scepticism about the government’s handling of the overlapping area negotiations persists, especially in relation to Thaksin. Ms Paetongtarn must ensure that the MoU would not allow powerful individuals to benefit at the country’s expense. Transparency is crucial for the government to dispel these suspicions and demonstrate that the agreement serves the national interests.
At present, Thailand’s social media is the mainstream media. YouTubers are setting daily agendas as never before. Through their social media platform, nationalist groups have harped about historical grievances, highlighting past bitter memories. Indeed, without clear public support and education, extreme nationalism could undermine the government’s ability to negotiate effectively with Cambodia.